Longwood University

Digital Commons @ Longwood University
Theses, Dissertations & Honors Papers
1964

Andrew Johnson and the Failure of Moderate Reconstruction
Fraces Jo-Ann Cartwright

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.longwood.edu/etd
Part of the United States History Commons

ANDREW JOHNSON
and
THE FAILURE OF MODERATE RECONSTRUCTION

By Frances Jo-Ann Cartwright

1964

PREFACE
This paper represents an attempt to determine why Andrew Johnson's
moderate policy for the reconstruction of the South failed.

Because the

paper is a study of Andrew Johnson, the politician, it dwells primarily
only upon the political climate of 1865--although the importance of the
social and economic changes occuring during reconstruction is recognized,
they are herein treated only incidentally.
the defeat of a politician.

In essence, the paper demonstrates

It is, furthermore, the contention of the paper

that moderate reconstruction failed because of the ineffectiveness of its
administrator--Andrew Johnson--not because of cabalistic intrigues hatched
by those whom F.B. Simkins scoffingly calls "Carlyle's wild-eyed conspir
ators."

Johnson was no helpless victim of the unconquerable radical forces

about him, but became hopelessly ensnared in a defeat woven by his own
inflexible, egotistical temperament which resulted in both political mis
judgements and incompetent political maneuvers.
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Never has there been a greater necessity for a good politician in the
White House than during Reconstruction.

Terminating at last after four

years of struggle, the Civil War left in its wake a United States politi
cally divided.

Lincoln had desired to insure the perpetuity of the Union

by restoring it as speedily as possible, Most of the Northern Republicans
wished to delay the restoration until the South was well enough reconstructed
that they would be able to preserve the victory by maintaining political
supremacy.

Generally, the Northern Republicans foresaw reconstruction

as a continuance of what the Beards would call a progressive bourgeois
revolution or the "second American revolution"--the Civil War.

The Northern

Democrats viewed reconstruction as the means by which the South would
be restored as quickly as possible to a political existence, thereby restor
ing the Democratic Party to its former political importance.

The moderate

Republicans were concerned with attracting the greatest number of adher
ents and consequently supported the methods of reconstruction through which
they would eventually wield the greatest power.

Flexible and attuned to the

opinion of the public, they--the moderates--were the ones whom Johnson
should have made the greatest effort to cultivate.
Nevertheless, the problem of the South was before them and everyone
agreed that these states had to be reconstructed; the differences evolved
out of questions involving degree and the methods to be employed.

Various

proposals were available representing both the moderate and radical view
points.

The moderate plan, of which Lincoln was generally considered the

author, advocated the restoration of the South by the loyal inhabitants of
each state.

In opposition was the State Suicide theory as presented to

Congress by the radical Charles Sumner in 1862.

To Sumner, secession followed

by armed rebellion constituted an abdication of all rights of the state

- 2which should henceforth be governed by Congress as a territory.

Only a

small group of radical zealots composed of such men as the aforementioned
Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens were in favor of a radical plan. As the mili
tary governor of Tennessee who had persecuted the rebels, Johnson had
set a record favorable to the radical elements in the North.

Unlike the

radicals, however, the majority were content to wait and see the tone of
action the new President would take.
Probably, it was the end of a grueling war enhanced by the immediate
assassination of a beloved President which invoked a more vindictive
Northern temper of opinion towards the South than Lincoln had judged.
This is demonstrated by the almost universal support the seemingly radical
Johnson received during his first two months in office.

Indeed, the

�ion was prophesying "an end to parties." The Herald denied this and
stated that there were, on the contrary, "so many irons in this fire, that
some of them must get spoiled by too much heat. 11 1 Both statements were
actually well-founded.

There was only one existing party--the Union one,

but this party was composed of numerous elements which had united in re
sponse to the wartime necessity for union.

And indeed, the various factions

were toppling over one another in their haste to court the favor of the
President.

Surprisingly enough, the most radical--despite theft heretofore

radical reconstruction proposals--were the least active in this capacity.
The moderates--Setiard-Weed Republicans and the war Democrats led by Mont
gomery Blair and S.L.M. Barlow-- were the ones engaged in political
maneuvers during the early portion of Johnson 1 s administration.

To further

complicate the problem of reconstruction, these two moderate factions en
gaged in strong competition for the!President 1 s support.

Each tried tp

convince the other that the President was supporting its party in policy.

- 3Throughout the summer months of 1865, Johnson cultivated division in the
political ranks by his refusal to state a position.

His course was clear-

ly that of uniting the moderates-- the Democrats and moderate Republicans-
rather than contributing to greater schisms within theiT ranks by a policy
consistent only in its vacillation.

If Johnson had found a common ground for

these two groups and himself at the outset, he could have avoided the later
political alienation and prevented the triumph of radical reconstruction.
Any political evaluation of Johnson requires a comparison between the
seventeenth president and his predecessor, Abraham Lincoln, as Johnson sup
posedly attempted to follow his policy regarding the reconstruction of the
Southern states.

Superficially, the backgrounds of Lincoln and his suc

cessor appear analogous.

Both were products of an Appalachian environment

hostile to the northern and southern coastal factions.

Both were self-

made men who rose to power via the good will of their strong, simple, fron
tier neighbors.

Towards the southern aristocracy, the two men were both

inclined to be suspicious.

Johnson, especially, had frequently been the

brunt of their snobbery and prejudice.

Lincoln, conversely, had no such

backlog of dislikes manifested against these landowners.

Thus, regarding

reconstruction, Lincoln's primary motivation was derived more completely form
a desire to preserve the Union whereas Johnson's was more on the order of
a personal vendetta against the privileged slavocracy.

Even in the early

beginnings of his political career, this characteristic is visible.

One of

his earliest campaign platfonns centered around the removal of a wealthy,
controlling class when Johnson was elected alderman at the age of twenty.
Throughout his political career, his life evidences many instances of one
continuous struggle against privilege.

As such, he rallied around him

the support of the masses in their inevitable opposition to entrenched

-4privilege.

Formal crystallization of his prejudice occurred during the

Civil War.

Johnson viewed this war as one perpetrated by the southern

aristocracy in order to perpetuate its existing status as the privileged
class.

AR a Unionist and military governor of Tennessee, he and his fellow

Unionists were persecuted by the Confederate soldiers.

Johnson believed that

these soldiers acted as the unknowing implements of an unscrupulous aristocracy.
On his advent to power in East Tennessee, he proved the depth of his
hatred through a zealous persecution of his former persecutors--the rebels.
Although Lincoln's background was not one in which an attitude of trust
might have been generated towards the ruling elite, neither does his life
evidence as many injustices because of them.

Consequently, Lincoln appears

less vindictive in reference to the landed gentry; his amnesty proclamation
does not single them out for specific punishment or revenge.

Johnson, how

ever, can conceal neither his animosity nor his resulting distrust.

In

his amnesty proclamation of May 29, it is scarcely remarkable to discover
the inclusion of a new exception made for those worth twenty thousand
dollars or more.
turn to power.

Intensely, Johnson feared from this group a possible re
It was his contention that they were the true war criminals

who had fostered rebellion and had used their power to dupe the basically
loyal masses into a wicked adherence to the Confederacy.

During his mili

tary governorship of Tennessee, he dwelled upon this point repeatedly in
<->poovhoo modA

:ln ll.prll and May.

One such example follows:

And while I say that the penalties of the law, in a stern and in
flexible manner, should be executed upon conscious, intelligent and
influential trait.ors-- the leaders, who have deceived thousands of
laboring men who ha-vi:} ,h•own 1nt.o th-I fi 1·obc-, l l ; ..,n--!ln<i while I say,

-5as to the leaders, punishment, I also say leniency, conciliation and
amnesty to the thousands whom they have misled and deceived. 2
Under this banner, he was able to captivate the masses.
he would begin his presidency

in

It follows then that

a vein which had proved politically effec

tive in th'3 p2.st.
Although similar in background, the two men could scarcely have differed
more in character.

Basically, Lincoln was pragmatic; Johnson was dogmatic.

Lincoln was conciliatory; his successor was dictatorial.

As president,

Lincoln was often at odds with those around him--the Chase-Blair controversy
in the cabinet is well-known as is the congressional problem manifested
in the \-Jade-Davis Bill which was pocket-vetoed by Lincoln.

Lincoln, how

ever, was a shrewd politician and as such managed to concede just enough to
avoid the creation of significant schisms within his own party.

Johnson,

conversely, was neemingl:, adept in creating havoc within the party ranks.
In Ten!1'3SE"ee, 0a'.l'.'licr, he hc1.d stimulated strife and a resultfo3 chaos which
madB impossible the restoration Lincoln desirecl

Johnson even had diffi-

culty maintaining the support of his Unionist a1lies--Brownlow particularly-
largely because of his absolutist policies.

As mHitnry governor, Johnson Is

tactics were those of a tyrant who suppressed, arrested, and exiled those
who disagreed with him.

Early in this career in Tennessee, he decided to

hold a "test election" involving the post of circuit judge.

When the re

turns showed the triumph of an anti-administration man, the victor was prompt
ly ordered imprisoned.

In relations with his constituents--in this case,

primar:_ly the military--he appeared no less the absolutist.

During this

period, the o,s,s:i.stant secretary of war Thomas A. Scott wrote Stanton de
p:l.r.ting Johmion in t!-le following fashion:
The governor's relations with most of the lesser officers ••• were no

-6less strained. The fact is, he was self-willed, uncompromising and
dictatorial, and once his mind was made up, intolerant of opposition
or even of honest opinion in conflict with his own. Impatient and
rough in speech, abrupt and belligerent in manner, his attitude re
pelled any calm discussion and adjustment of difficulties with
officers accustomed3to military etiquette and jealous of the dignity
of their positions.
Thus, whereas Lincoln was humble and generally asked the advice of his
constituents, Johnson was, as the prededing description suggests, an ego
tist who remained impervious to the changes and influences which existed
outside of his own subjective realm. By tempering firmness with flexi
bility, Lincoln managed to control his cabinet and Congress and thereby to
retain political ascendancy.

Combining indecision, stubbornness, and

arrogance, Johnson alienated influential political allies in his cabinet-
the prime example being Stanton--and in Congress--Stevens and Sumner-
forcing his allies--the Weed and Seward elements--to desert to the enemy.
Good judgement is probably any man's greatest asset, but this is
doubly so for a politician.

Lincoln possessed it; Johnson did not.

The

appointments, political alliances, patronage, are all an essential part of
it, but it is in timing that the greatest consideration must be shown.
Only if the moment proves propitious can the most available advantage be
secured.

For the politician, public opinion serves as the timepiece which

must be faithfully observed and correctly interpreted to prove effective.
Being politically astute, Lincoln issued both his emancipation and amnesty
proclamations at opportune moments.

Concerning a policy to reconstruct

the southern states, he was equally sagacious.

In order to insure that

his reconstruction policy would correspond with the relatively fluid con
cepts of the general public and those of Congress, Lincoln frequently
altered it.

Possessing that which psychologists would tenn an inaccessible

-7behavior pattern, Johnson, conversely, proved often oblivious to the con
sequences of the dynamic world of public opinion about him.

Both Eric

I1cKitrick and Robert Winston--authors of opposing works in relation to
Johnson--support this.

Winston, an admirer of Johnson, states that "Be

cause of his (Johnson's) unwillingness to co-operate with political parties
or organizations, Johnson waged but a guerilla warfare ••• •

Always, however,

he stood upon the old platform, equal distribution of government favors,
equal treatment of rich and poor, farmer, laborer, mechanic, manufacturer
or what not.

A strict interpretation of the Constitution and observance of

its letter had now become his guiding principle. 114 Thus, Winston credits
Johnson as being inflexible in ideals and principles.

McKitrick goes

further and intimates that Johnson first lost contact with the political
world about him and then anchored himself to impressive theories and princi

ples • .5 The vacillation viewed in Johnson I s policies in 186.5--especially the
early summer months--tends to substantiate McKitrick 1 s premise.

Never

theless, both Winston and McKitrick maintain that Johnson was relatively
alienated from the world of public opinion.
Al though he must have been superficially aware of the changes, Johnson
refused to acknowledge them and thereby failed to heed the warnings they
encompassed.

To maintain popular support for his policy, Johnson had to

demonstrate that the South had been reconstructed--at least, moderately
so.

Popular sentiment had made the Negro the measuring stick by which the

South's reconstruction {abrogation of former beliefs) was to be determined.
Johnson, nevertheless, failed to firmly persuade the assembled State legis
latures to act in accordance with these dictates of public opinion.
tone of

messages received

from

the provisi.onal

governorS"

by

The

Johnson clearly

-8-

asked to what extent the South needed to concede in terms of Negro rights.
Johnson's continued delays in replying constituted a blunder which insti
tuted a chain reaction in the other states resulting in an aroused public
demanding a more stringent reconstruction of the still rebellious South.
Then, it appears that in order to exercise good judgement, a politician
must be something of a prophet foreseeing the result of his maneuvers.
Johnson, however, was only an average man who was out of place outside his
native Tennessee. Uncertain in the demanding role of president, he was in
decisive and unable--because of his inflexible temperament--to adapt to the
changed situation resulting from the termination of the war.
Basically, this inability to recognize and utilize such changes effected
by the war's termination ultimately proved to be Johnson's most blatant
error in political judgement.

Handicapped by being Lincoln's theoretical

heir, Johnson attempted to continue what he believed to be Lincoln's policy
for reconstructing the South.
nateed

by

Lincoln's reconstruction plans had been domi

a concentrated campaign to negotiate the end of the war.

Generally,

Lincoln's proposed policy for reconstruction evolved out of an already exe
cuted plan designed to conciliate the all-important border states. 6 The
composition of his cabinet clearly reflected this in his choice of Edward
Bates, Missouri and Montgomery Blair, Maryland.

By utilizing the patronage,

Lincoln sought to keep the border states within the Union.

The pardoning

power, he used as a mode of encouragement to create desertion and disaffec
tion towards the Confederate government.

Seceded states were to re-es

tablish state governments following compliance with the clause of Lincoln's
December 3, 18 63 amnesty proclamation which required that ten percent of
the population have taken the loyalty oath.

Establishment of the Gamble

government in the border state of Missouri probably initiated this proclama-

-9tion • . In.relation to pardons, they were to
a loyalty oath.

be

granted to all those who took

The exceptions to the general amnesty were the expected ones

dealing predominantly with those who had fought in or directly abetted
the rebellion.

Primarily, the proclarnation--especially that portion governing

the exceptions--was general enough to allow greater leeway in the granting
of pardons and the taking of oaths.

It was in character, then, that he should

apply the pocket veto to the more specific Wade-Davis Manifesto of 1864
as he did not , in his own words, wish

11 • • • to

be

inflexibly committed to any

single plan of restoration, 11 nor did he desire that

11 • • •

the free state con

stitutions and governments already adopted and installed in Arkansas and
Louisiana shall be set aside and held for nought thereby repelling and

discouraging (other) loyal citizens ••• , 11 7 but he did intimate that Southern
states acting in compliance with this plan would be recognized by him.
Lincoln's guiding principle was the preservation of a union divided by
war.

To effect this end, any means within reason would be unhesitatingly

employed.
essentials.
not lose.
this union.

Consequently, Lincoln's plan proceeded in accordance with various
First, the rebellion had to be stamped out--the North could
Secondly, the South had to be restored in order to perpetuate
The former was irrefutably a part of Lincoln I s plan; the

latter has been implied.

The first objective remained the most important

determinant in Lincoln's policy; his assassination nipped in the bud his
plans for accomplishing the second objective.

Indeed, W.B. Hesseltine

asserts that Lincoln died without an actual plan for either restoration
or reconstruction of the conquered South.

Thus, it would

be

difficult

to ascertain whether or not Lincoln's wartime moderate plan of restoration
would have been applied to the peacetime South or not.

The only certain

thing about Lincoln's future policy would have been its assured flexibility
geared to meet the fluctuating majority opinions of the times.
As Lincoln's heir, Johnson attempted to follow the policy which was
generally considered to be that moderate, wartime restoration of the states
promulgated by this successor.

Johnson was devoted also to the preservation

of the Union, and to him this would be effected
recently in rebellion.

by

restoration of the states

Eric McKitrick asserts that Johnson was concerned

with actual reconstruction, however, only in connection with individuals,
rather than in reference to the Southern states collectively.

In view of

the President 1 s kno,m aversion towards the landed aristocracy, this appears
logical.

Johnson apparently believed that an inclusion of the twenty thou

sand dollar property qualification in the list of exceptions of his May
29 proclamation thereby necessitating pardon would humble this proud class
of individuals lnto a 0reconstructed" state.
form, was alien to his constitutional beliefs.

Reconstruction, in any other
Like his predecessor, John

son's primary objective continued, therefore, to be the preservation of the
Union, but he linked this principle with a finn belief in states rights.
Both he and Lincoln rejected the theory that the war had taken away a state's
constitutional right to a republican fonn of government.

In his amnesty

proclamation of 1863, Lincoln stated that " ••• this proclamation is intended
to present the people of the states wherein the national authority has been
suspended, and loyal state governments have been subverted, a mode in and
1vhich the national authority and loyal state governments may be re-es
tablished within said states, or in any of them ••• • 118 Johnson said much

by

the same in a later address wherein he maintained that the function of the
states had been nothing more than suspended:

-11The true theory is that all pretended acts of secession were from
the beginning null and void. The States can not commit treason
nor screen the individual citizens who may have committed treason any
more than they can make valid treaties or engage in lawful commerce
with any foreign power. The States attempting to secede placed them
selves in a condition where their vitality was impaired, bu� not
extinguished; their functions suspended, but not destroyed.
Constitutionally, Johnson could therefore not accept Sumner's state suicide
theory or Stevens' conquered province plan.
could and should be reconstructed.
to the natural position.

Individuals--the aristocracy-

The states, however, were to be restored

Reconstruction was to

be

effected

by

the states

themselves. Thus, Johnson's program encompassed individual reconstruction
and state restoration.
In another instance, Johnson was further handicapped by his attempt to
adhere to Lincoln's probable plan of reconstruction.

The primary difficulty

lay in the fact that the last reconstruction plan of his successor had been
a war measure designed to divide the South, thus facilitating a Union victory.
Johnson used much the same polciy to unite the nation. Specifically, Lin
coln used the pardoning power to turn neighbor against neighbor with the
purpose of creating havoc within. the Confederate ranks.
win support for selfish and political reasons.

Johnson pardoned to

Lincoln's objective, however,

was still in evidence, as the Johnson pardonings, intended to create unity,
continued to instigate strife between the former loyalists and the newly
pardoned.

T.G. Clark of Savannah wrote to Johnson intimating this in

October:
The State of Georgia is in almost as rebellious a condition at heart
today as she bas been any time during the war •••• Before Pardons were
granted the political instigators of the Rebellion were held in check;
they were all endeavoring to see which could do most for t� union and
magnifying little acts of courtesy (sic) to union men••••
The Unionists saw themselves as deprived of their rewards for remaining
loyal to the Union.

Loyalist protests aroused a vindictive North who, dedi-

-12cated to the protection of their southern Unionist allies, desired more
a preservation of their hard-won victory than an immediate restoration of
an unstable South-North union on the order of the ante-bellum sectionalism
with the South resurrecting the old roadblocks to northern progress.

The

situation had changed from one of war to one of peace in which the nation had
taken on the new divisions of conqueror and conquered.
the moment, been preserved; whether or not it would

be

The Union had, for
perpetuated depended

upon how effective the method of restoration would prove.

Hesseltine

contends that the North fought the war specifically in order to reconstruct
the South on the northern model.
ing.

To the North, the question was one of tim

How long would it take the South to discard certain beliefs and prac

tices which had formerly obstructed the progress of the nation? If the
war had effected this already, the Southern states would act accordingly;
if not, they would need to undergo further reconstruction in order to ac
complish the result desired by the North.

As aforementioned, Johnson was

totally unconcerned with reconstruction.

Indeed, it was outside the realm

of his preconceived plans, all of which involved restoration.

In November,

George L. Stearns wrote Johnson apparently apologizing for his use of the word
reconstruction.

"Restoration," he said, "was in your thought, reconstruction

in mine; hence the use of the word. rrll

In accordance with Lincoln I s wartime

policy, Johnson was restoring the South, but peace had revolutionized both
conditions and opinions.

For Lincoln, the wisest course was to divide the

South in order to unite the nation--this was possible only through a northern
victory.

For Johnson, the indicated course was to make--remake--the South

acceptable to the northern conquerors.

Therefore, Lincoln's wartime policy

of restoration had coincided with the objective of the northern warriors-
both desiring victory.

Johnson's policy, on the other hand, foretold

- 13a destruction of the northern desire for the fruits of victory.

Public

opinion, therefore, had favored Lincoln's policy but feared Johnson's
similar one as a result of the changed situation.
Imperceptibly intermingled in the restoration plans of Lincoln and
Johnson were their former political af'filiations.
appear primarily antithetical.

In this aspect, the two

Lincoln was a Whig who became a Republican;

Johnson was a states:r-ights Democrat who became a Unionist.

As a Democrat

in the Jacksonian tradition, Johnson believed in the power and infallibility
of the masses.

As with Jackson, Johnson perhaps had too much faith in and

identified himself too completely with the majority.

As a 1.-Jhig, Lincoln

was inclined to be more conservative in reference to the will of the majori
ty,

A clever politician, he knew how to manipulate them--the masses--

and give the appearance of submission to them.

Johnson, on the other hand,

was a rabble rouser who might say anything to win the applause of an audi
ence,

On receiving such approval, Johnson accepted it as the mandate by

which he had been chosen the leader of the masses.
majority were one.

He, Johnson, and the

However he acted, they would support him.

The 1·Jhigs,

generally speaking, were more Hamiltonian in outlook while the Democrats
were more Jeffersonian or Jacksonian.

In this context, the Democrats main

tained a quasi-Jacksonian doctrine of states rights invoked towards internal
improvements and the national bank.

Johnson was in accord, but, like ·

his hero Jackson, believed firmly in the preservation of the Federal Union.
It was on this latter issue that he and Lincoln became allies and later run
ning mates on the Unionist ticket.

As the only southern senator to remain in

Con�ress after the secession of his state, Johnson became progressively more
closely aligned with the radical element.

Had the slavery controversy

-14never provoked war, Johnson would quite probably have remained in the Demo
cratic ranks.

Indeed, when he acceded to the presidency, the consensus of

opinion, becoming increasingly more creditable, was that he was rapidly re
turning to his former political affiliation.

Frequently, indeed, Johnson's

states-rights principles revealed an obvious handicap.

One example of this

is found in Johnson's attitude towards Negro suffrage.

Johnson believed

that the problem involving enfranchisement of the former slaves should be
left to the states for solution. A .letter from H.M. Watterson to the
President demonstrates the tenacity with which Johnson adhered to this
principle:
At Richmond, at New Berne, and at Raleigh, I have reason to know that
I have done some service to the administration by my representation of
its head. I have often said in the right quarters that from two posi
tions the Chases and Sumners would never drive the President: First,
that the Southern States are in the Union, and have never been £�t;
second, that the suffrage question belongs to the States alone.
Thus, despite northern public sentiment to the contrary, President Johnson
attempted to allow the problem to remain with states whom the North considered
vanquished and therefore without any rights whatsoever.

Strong constitu

tional principles were fine as long as they did not blockade a utilization
of the doctrine of expediency.

Any attempt to promulgate principles, to the

contrary, however, was punishable by disaffection of those in the power
club who demanded that the political game be played according to the under
stood rules.

Unfortunately, Johnson, the politician, neither knew these

rules nor was inclined to learn them from competent advisers.
The Negro, indeed, proved to be an important consideration in the
reconstruction policies of Lincoln and Johnson. Although Benjamin Quarles
in his Lincoln and the Negro attempts to attribute to the sixteenth president a genuine concern. for the rights of the freedmen, Lincoln seems, in

-15this instance as in every instance, preoccupied first and foremost by his
desire to see the Union preserved.

The Negro considered Lincoln his savior-

he had freed them from bondage by his Emancipation Proclamation.

He, however,

apparently ignored their problems as a whole--inadvertently championing them
when the attainment of their rights coincided with the realization of his
ultimate objective,

In fact, even Quarles admits that Lincoln is frequently

viewed as "dragging his feet" where Negro civil rights are concerned.

Lin

coln, however, realized the significance of the Negro question as the touch
stone of political propaganda which would eventually determine the degree
of reconstruction to be effected in the South.

Johnson, on the other hand,

virtually ignored the problem's intrinsic political capital.

In actuality,

Johnson had no basic understanding of the individual Negro's situation.

As

did, Lincoln, Johnson viewed the Negro as the means to an end, but charac
teristically misinterpreted the channel in which the importance of the
Negro was registered.

For Johnson, the Negroes were linked with the privileged

class and constituted the source from which that group drew their undemocratic
pouer and influence; once they were emancipated, the issue was for Johnson
closed.

Only later was Johnson forced to reopen the subject when northern

sentiment--regarding the Negro as the "index" by which they would evaluate
the extent of southern repentence--demanded it.

In this vein, Johnson

wrote Sharkey in August as follows:
I hope that without delay your convention will amend your State con
stitution, abolishing slavery and denying to all future Legislatures the
power to legislate that there is property in man; also... • If you
could extend the elective franchise to all persons of color who can
read the Constitution of the United States in English and write their
names, and to all persons of color who own real estate valued at not
less than two hundred and fifty dollars and pay truces thereon, you would
completely disarm the adversary and set an example the other States will
follow. This you can do with perfect safety, and you would thus place

-16Southern states in reference to free persons of color upon the same
basis with the free states••• • 13
This was extremely sound advice, the type Lincoln had given previously.
Unfortunately, for Johnson, he again erred in judgement and failed to
follow through on this step firmly enough to accomplish what the North
anticipated. He suggested a qualified Negro suffrage.

Had he insisted

that such a limited enfranchisement was necessary, the submissive South
would have probably granted it.
Throughout, Johnson's position in relation to the Negro question was
ambiguous.

Theoretically, Johnson would have not liked Negroes according to

J. T. Trowbridge who stated tr.at ''East Tennesseans, though opposed to slavery
and secession, do not like niggers.

There is at this day more prejudice

against color among the middle and poorer classes--the 'Union' men, of the
South, who owned few or no slaves--than among the planters who owned them
by scores and hundreds••• •

On reaching Nashville, I learned that the

Negro testimony bill had been defeated in the legislature by the members

from East Tennessee. 1114 A letter from one John W. Gorham of Clarksville,

Tennessee, verifies this attitude as being present in the President.

He

writes that he remembers the President remarking to him that he is "for a
white man 1 s Government in America. 11 Gorham proves prophetic of future issues
when he correctly states that "The question of Loyalty was then Union but
it 1 s now Negro suffrage regardless of all States and Federal Constitutions••• n3..5
However, Johnson was evidently, during the summer, closely allied with the
conception of white supremacy largely due to his background.

In an

interview with G. L. Stearns of the New York!!�, Johnson appeared in
league with the radical opposition to white supremacy when he said that if
he were in Tennessee, he would

11 • • •

try to introduce Negro suffrage gradually;

first those who had served in the army; those who could read and write; and

-17perhaps a property qualification for the others, say $200 or $250.

It would

not do to let the Negro have universal suffrage now; it would breed a war
of races. 1116 As president, Johnson did not feel that he could interfere
in Tennessee or in any other southern state. He would, however, he believed,
have been within his rights as governor of the state of Tennessee to initiate
such 'action.

The Negro issue was therefore inexorably fused with Johnson's

constitutional conceptions--the whole again illuminating his tragic flaw, that
of inflexibility.

To him, the freed Negro represented the deprivation of the

aristocracy 1 s power; the qualified enfranchisementaf the Negro represented an.
impediment to the radical plot to make it the decisive issue.
instances, he was correct.

In both

His mistake lay in his failure to attach the

proper degree of importance to the latter of the two and firmly forcing it-
in a limited form--upon the Southern states as necessary to restoration.
Another instance of Johnson's short-sightedness occurred in relation to
the Union party.

Throughout, Johnson manifested a continuous inabili�y to

grasp the differences of the Union party during the war and during the en
suing peace.

To Lincoln, such a party in time of war proved expedient.

Expedient, too, was the choice of Andrew Johnson as Lincoln's running mate.
Propaganda-wise, the formation of such a party was ingenious.

Its very name

represented a plea for a concentrated effort by all political factions to
join together to preserve the Federal Union.

Nonetheless, the composition

of such a party remained primarily Republican and once the objective of the
Union party was achieved, it would again become Republican, although nominally
retaining the former classification for as long as the name proved of
popular appeal. HcKitrick substantiates this by pointing out that the terms
Republican and Unionist were used interchangeably during the Reconstruction
era.17

Johnson's view of the party, however, was quite di.:fferent; he

-18apparently failed to realize that the end of the war left him outside the
party which had elected him.

True, as a former senator, Johnson had voted

with the Republicans, but this was the result of the changed circumstances
effected by the war and evolving out of the single desire to perpetuate
the Union.

The Union party as a workable relationship for Johnson was

rendered obsolete by the northern victory.

As R.R. Ormsby of Virginia

wrote in June, Johnson was in a strange postion:
You are in a peculiar postion. You are so far as I can see, surrounded
by the inveterate haters of the South, and in fellows��P with scarcely
a heart that w9uld have been cpngenial prior to 1861,
The Unionist name was retained for propaganda value; Andrew Johnson, the
most obvious evidence of its existence, was tolerated simply because he hap
pened to be president.

Therefore, the Republicans, especially the Seward

Weed element attempted to reconstruct him according to Republican ideas and
principles.

They wanted to make him a Republican.

much the same idea.

The radical element had

In July, Schurz wrote Sumner that "The President

must be talked to as much as possible:

he must not be left in the hands of h

his old associations that are more and more gathering around him. 1119

As president, Johnson wielded too much power to be ignored by the various
factions.

Therefore, he was zealously courted by all.

Such courtship was heightened by Johnson's policy of vacillation which
proved a constant source of frustration to the surrounding political elements.
G. William Curtis, the editor of Harper's Week_!y, probably expressed the senti
ments of the majority when he said that "I am getting very tired of this

state of not knowing exactly where we are. 1120 In December, he stated that
"It must end soon for Johnson must express himself in his message. 11 21

-19Such indecision derived primarily from Johnson's desire to form a new party,
a National Union Party, composed basically of the moderate eleme•ts--the
moderate Republicans, the war Democrats, and the restored Democrats.

In

Politics, Principle, and Prejudices, the Coxes--LaWanda and John--substan
tiate the

existence of such a party

recently available Barlow papers.

by the evidence discovered in the only

Such verification, however, can be

ascertained from the Johnson papers themselves.

For example, William

Collins wrote Johns Hopkins in June as follows:
It seems to me that the course of the President is clear. If he will
continue the battle he has long been fighting and give his confidence
only to the true hearted union men of the country and offer h::lmself
as their leader under the banner of the Union , pure and simple, in
my judgement, he will rally around h::lm thetrue hearted conservative
masses of the country and will be opposed only by the extremists of
the North and South. This opposition will cement the great Conserva
tive Party that will rally around him as the Union leader. If he
adopts the reforms of the Republican or of the Democratic or of the
Whig--or any other of the old parties--he dwarfs his position and
power to do good ••• • I am much mistaken if he does not place h::lm
self at the head of a great party, able and willing to bind up the
wounds of our country and to restore once more the National Patriot
iam.22
Reports from Pennsylvania were likewise encouraging. Thomas C. MacDowell
writes Johnson himself as follows:
Permit me to remark in this connexion (sic), that your policy is
cordially endorsed by the masses in this state, that is by the De
mocracy en masse and by the conservative Republicans, who make up
what is now, or soon will be, 'Known as the Johnson party of
Pennsylvania! a party I assure you, more formidable in point of num
bers, than any since the days of General Jackson.23
It was Johnson's delay in stating his position that precluded the
formation of a National Union Party.

The exigencies created in the after

math of war demanded action, not indecisive neutrality.

As long as Johnson's

position remained unclear, confusion would continue to rampage in the ranks
of those factions that he desired to coordinate into his great Johnson party.
Each faction--the Democratic and the Conservative Republicans--was working

-20individually rather than in combination to secure presidential support and
political power.
ples.

Each side believed the President supporting its princi

Such confusion is revealed in the attempt of the moderate Republican

organ--the New York �--to erect a gulf between the reconstruction policy
of the Democracy and that of the President. This is demonstrated by the
following article:
Their (Democracy) theory is that the close of the war of itself re
vives the relations of the rebel states to the Union, ••• • On the
other hand, President Johnson's principle is that the abeyance of con
stitutional rights does not pass away with the mere close of the war••••
The Democratic Party, considers that the Southern States have a right
to restoration, immediate and unconditional. President Johnson,
on the other hand, deems it to be both his right and his duty to
impose conditions. 24
Barlow later treats this specifically in a letter to R. Taylor in which he
states his expectation that "Seward and Stanton will seek to influence the
new party as they have the Republican party in the past, and I am utterly
opposed to any alliance with them and to the formation of any new party in which
they are to become the permanent leaders. 11 25
ficult to overcome.

Such animosity proved dif-

Johnson's political policies should have been based

upon consolidation rather than fragmentation; he should have been concentrating
on bringing the two elements together, specifying their points of agreement and
obscuring their differences.

The issue was reconstruction and the two elements

agreed that it should be moderate.

Johsnon should have toned down the race

question being proffered inopportunely by the Democrats and urged union of thee
moderates to preserve the unity of the nation.
petty differences to gain in momentum.

Instead, he allowed their

Not even the

e11+-+hr0a.t

c:rn1p::,ien

in New York between these two facti nno ..r.1:Jglitened him into solidifying the
increasingly more fluid lines of his support.

Therefore, the Democrats con

tinued to labor for a united Democratic party with the President at its head,

-21and the moderate Republicans were forced to seek alignment with the radicals
in order to prevent a triumph of the party whom they considered to have been
in opposition to the recent glorious war.

The Democracy's insistence upon

provoking the issue of Negro suffrage further angered the moderate Repubi
cans.
11

The latter considered the Negro and the Unionists to constitute the

index 11 previously mentioned which would determine how moderate reconstruction

could afford to be.

To them, the issue was always that of reconstruction

rather than restoration--the question being only one of degree.

Unconditional

restoration won Democratic approval as the most rapid means by which the
party would be united and capable of contemplating victory at the polls.
Johnson appeared to be in accord with the Democrats; in concentrating on
restoring the South and thereby increasing his political support, Johnson
exercised poor judgement. Apparently, he overlooked the fact that the South's
future political existence depended upon the pleasure of the North.

There

fore, Johnson's attempt to shift the emphasis of the Union party to the
Southern Democracy was predestined to failure unless he, first, was able to
secure a substantial portion of Northern political support.
All of these elements formed an integral part of Johnson's over-all
program.

At the time of his advent to the presidency, however, Johnson's

course of action was enveloped in speculation nor did his forthcoming addres
ses relieve the political tension. In a speech before an Indiana delega
tion, Johnson showed the following characteristic ambiguity:
As to an indication of any policy which may be presented by me in
the administration of the government, I have to say that that must
be left for development as the administration progresses ••• • The
only assu �nce that I can now give of the future is by reference to the
past... • 2
The radicals consequently proceeded to remember his radical acts as military

-82governor of Tennessee; the Democrats recalled his Democratic, Southern
background, and the moderate Republicans began vying for his favor,
were proceeding upon a polciy based on wishful guesswork.

All

With the amnesty

and North Carolina provisional governor proclamations of May 29, a solidi
fication of the President's policies appeared imminent.

The amnesty procla

mation was analogous to that previously issued by Lincoln, but it reflected
certain Johnsonian tinges such as the twenty thousand dollar property quali
fication and the provision for executive pardoning.
was the increased number of exceptions,
ately vague to allow flexibility;
belied his later leniency,

Typically Johnsonian also

Lincoln's plan had been made deliber

Johnson's demonstrated a rigidity which

The proclamation appointing W.W. Holden provisional

governor of North Carolina provided that the provisional governor should
"prescribe such rules and regulations as may· be necessary and proper for con
vening a convention, composed of delegates to be chosen by that portion of the
people of said state who are loyal to the United States, and nc others,
for the purpose of altering or amending the Constitution thereof, and with
authority to exercise, within the limits of said State, all the powers
necessary and proper to enable such loyal people of the State of North
Carolina to restore said State to its constitutional relations to the
Federal Government and to present such a republican form of government ••• , 11 27
Similar proclamations were issued to the other Southern states with the
exception of the four states already set up by Lincoln.
restoration,

In order to attain

the Southern state conventions were expected to declare

secession null and void, abolish slavery and repudiate the debts incurred in
the aid of the rebellion.

After this was satj_sfactorily effected, the states

were allowed to hold popular elections.

These were the fundamentals of the

-23plan which Johnson seemingly followed to secure restoration.

As to the actual

reconstruction of the states, nothing was specifically stated.
Although restoration was Johnson 1 s prime concern, he was also motivated
by political aspirations.

Throughout, the new President was attempting to

establish a new middle-of-the-road party with himself at its head.

His

actions therefore veered towards reaching this ultimate objective. Especially
is this evidenced in his utilization of the patronage and pardoning powers.
Through patronage, Johnson hoped to retain the support of the various
elements.

Accordingly, he replaced the naval officership of the New York

City customhouse with the Democrat Odell.

The moderate and radical Re

publican elements were gratified by his maintenance of Seward and Stanton
in the cabinet,

It was around the aforementioned customhouse that a great

deal of controversy revolved.
King, this proved markedly so.
fill the vacated post.

Following the suicide of the collector, Preston
All factions proceeded to exert pressure to

Again, Johnson was dilatory and failed to appoint

a successor until the following year thus engendering the suspicions of the
various elements.
were the Democrats.

Loudest in their bid for a benevolent patronage policy
In 1865, the Democrats were already engaged in what

Barlow wrote they were attempting in 1 66 when he stated that,

11 • • •

we are

now trying to play cuckoo and lay our eggs in the Republican nest with
Johnson and I think we shall succeed. 1128 Thus, the Democrats were attempt
ing to derive patronage benefits through a man elected on the Union ticket-
a party from which the Republicans primarily drew their support.

During

1866, James Ford Rhodes says that Johnson had removed 1,283 postmasters
in addition to numerous customhouse and internal revenue officials, but in
1 65,

the President seldom utilized his patronage power.

Those appointments

-24he did make were geared towards the conciliation of all factions rather
Unheeded

than towards the solidification of a strong political front.

went the ast,ute advice of the war Democrats who cautioned Johnson to appoint
only the men who would "without doubt whatsoever support you and your policy
in 1868. 1129

Instead, Johnson tried to maintain the support of all which

he did somewhat loosely.

History has frequently shown the triumph of a�

organized minority and the defeat of the disorganized

mnD'1<,'.;s.

A politician

can rarely afford to live in the past or present; his ambition almost in
variably associates him with the future.

JobnPon'o policy appears enveloped

in principles and aims designed to return the nation of 1865 miraculously to
that of 1860.

War, more than any otl1er single force, demands change to

adjust to its exigencies; once in motion, forces of change are not easily
arrested, even for peace.

In attempting to do the impossible--arrest

change--Johnson would naturally arouse the hostility of those in the North
who had fought the war specifically to create a world in which change would
be allowed.
The epitome of Johnson's power of appointment is reflected in his
selection of provisional governors for the Southern states.

Generally,

the President tried to aaintain his neutral position by appointing neither
unconditional secessionists nor unconditional Unionists.

He tried to choose

Unionists like himself who would be interested primarily in restoration.
Of such union predilections were William Marvin, Florida; James Johnson,
Georgia; Lewis E. Parsons, Alab2.llla; A.J. Hamilton, Texas; ),J.W. Holden,
North Carolina; Hilliam L. Sharkey, Mississippi; and B. F. Perry, South
Carolina.

Johnson simply reccgnized the ten per cent governors--F.

Pierpont, Virginia; Issac Murphy, Arkansas; J.M. Wells, Louisiana; and
Hilliam Brownlow, Tennessee.

W.1:-J. Holden, the first governor appointed

by Johnson, was far from worthy, proving a political opportunist who used
the pardoning power granted to him by the President to curry influential
favor within the state.
Johnson

Jonathan Dorris' Pardon and A�esty under Lincoln and

presents a detailed account of Holden's activities as provisional

governor of North Carolina during 186$.

In this account, Governor Holden

appears in a most unfavorable light.

Because of past actions also, Holden

was unacceptable to the truly loyal.

Prior to the war, he had been a se

cessionist.

Although less unscrupulous, B.F. Perry of South Carolina

proved scarcely more acceptable.

Before the war, he had ardently opposed

secession, but after the war had begun, he served as a Confederate commis
sioner, district attorney, and district judge.

As provisional governor, he

was most meticulous in reporting his pardons to the President, but he
aroused Unionist suspicion when he reappointed all those who had held office
at the time of the collapse of the state government.

h1. L. Sharkey, as a

former states-rights 1-Jhig and Unionist, was the natural choice for provisional
governor of Mississippi.

Parsons, renowned for his Unionism and obstruction

of the Confederate cause, became the provisional governor of Alabama.
Murphy, Brownlow, and Hamilton were, as governors, the prototypes of
Johnson as military governor of Tennessee.

They also despised the aristo

cratic "e.uthors of the rebellion" and desired revenge.

There was for them

no satisfaction in granting pardons and thus openin� the way for the rebels'
return to power.
political rewards.

A victory had been won and they desired to reap its
Had Johnson remained governor of Tennessee, NcKitrick

is probably right in maintaining that he, as governor, would have opposed
such a policy as the one he, as president, promulgated.30
As president, Johnson, however, gambled

for higher stakes; his goal

-26was a new, National Union party which would secure his nomination for
president in 1868.

Excluding the three previously designated governors,

the others were probably nothing more than innocent accessories to the
National Union party scheme.

Host of them were respected by the state as

a whole and would prove good contacts in Johnson I s plan to carry the South
in

1

68. As Unionists, they were to lead their states to reunion and restora

tion.

The role Johnson assigned the Unionist provisional governors was to

be duplicated by all Unionists in relation to the :now pal' ty. They were to
form the core of the governments and effect hasty restoration.
stance, Johnson's reasoning was specifically fallacious.

In this in

First, he under

estimated the number of Unionists in each state--he pictured the states as
miniature East Tennessees.

James Johnson elucidates this fallacy in his

response to Johnson I s que1·y rogarding appointments. The governor answers
that he "• •. ha::; g.Lvou all prot·oronce to union men... •

r,Jhen this is not

the case it is because there is no other application for the place. 11 31
Second, he failed to understand the political ineptitude of the Unionist
group as a 1-1hole--the outstanding rebels were generally those with the
greatest political experience. Third, Johnson again ignored the difference
peace had made in the solution of the problem.

His governors, like their su

perior; were tryi::-ig to recapture the past rather than to reconstruct for
a better future. They failed, as did Johnson, because they did not realize
that the war had itself provided the beginnings of a reconstruction which
necessitated completion as the only means by uhich a lasting peace could be
projocted.

The ec�tional differences originally instigating the civil struggle

J1.2d to be obliterated in order to forestall similar strife in the future.
But t),.:,

Pl. vv.i ...:;; c•na.l

governors had--as Simkins says of B.F. Perry in his
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South Carolina During Reconstruction--too much blind faith in Andrew John-

�.;;.;.

son.

This was the greatest flaw in Johnson's provisional governor appoint

ments--Johnson, himself.
In 1865, the issue was not as much that of Johnson's appointments--he
made so few definitive ones--as it was his policy of granting pardons.

The

amnesty proclamation of Hay 29 had listed fourteen classifications of
persons who were excepted from the general amnesty and who would remain so
unless pardoned by the chief executive.

Such terms were undoubtedly based

upon Johnson's desire to effect general restoration but individual reconstruc
tion.

Johnson's wrath was directed specifically towards the aristocrats

whom he desired to humble.

Using the pardoning power as his equalizing

instrument, Johnson was able to both placate his egotism and to restore,
subject to congressional approval, the South to its ante-bellum status minus
the objectionable slavery.

Glorying in the fmming admiration of those by

whom he had always been scorned, Johnson used the pardon power indiscrimi
nately, ultimately nullifying it by stimulating a Southern cocksureness which
resulted in alarming the North.

Unionist protests came from the South and

were heard by a sympathetic North distrustful of a Democratic South.

A

Unionist of Henrico County, Virginia, wrote Justin Morrill in December that
"President Johnson is pardoning all the rebels here and •••men are getting
pardoned who was (sic) never worth twenty thousand dollars in their life
but want to take advantage of the northern men to
accoun t • • • • 1132

borry (sic) money on

Southern Unionists felt as indeed did the North that their

persecutions by Confederates during the war should now be avenged.

With

each pardon, the possibility of such became increasingly more nebulous.
Thus, Johnson as the executor of these odious pardons attracted a great deal

-28-

of suspicion which resulted in the disaffection of this Unionist group.
In a letter from Savannah, Alex W. Wilson substantiates this increasing

animosity of the Union men i.n rAfr-n•on"o +.o ,TvlmA<m Is .Jeni P.Tlny ;:is i"o] 7 ows:
All speak in your praise, but the hard headed union men who suffered
persecutions are a little Soured. They say treason is not a crime
when suoh mffn ::i.s Henry R. Jackson of Savannah ••• can get pardons and
.n::otur-ed to all their original privileges. I think this is more from
a deaire to see such men punished through pride than patriotism, but it
is a fact in Geo. that those who have been the best union men during the
war are taking a position against the administration. 33
Reports and protests such as these angered the Republican North who be
lieved that the Unionists should be rewarded rather than punished for their
former loyalty.

The Republicans, led by the radicals, therefore saw Johnson 1 s

policy as too moderate to secure the fruits of victory to themselves and
the Southern Unionists and Negroes.

Increasingly, they viewed a thorough

reconstruction of the South as the only recourse.
Houever, Johnson I s pardon maneuvers were not as irrational as they
appeared superficially.

The shift which occurred, seemingly demonstrated by

the profuse exercise of this power to pardon, was calculated by Johnson
to establish his own National Union Party.

Strictly, the plan was a good

one; had Johnson wielded his power more judiciously, it very well might
have succeeded.

As it was, hcwever, he aroused much antagonism by what

most considered to be a shift from a radical to a moderate policy towards the
Southern states.

These people remembered with what zealous measures Johnson

had dealt with the rebels in East Tennessee and expected his presidential
policy to be a carry-over from that.

In fact, they were even quite fre

quently relieved that Johnson was the President instead of the beloved but
too lenient Lincoln.

In June, Samuel R. Snyder expressed this widespread

Northern opinion in a letter to the new President as follows:

-29••• yet I did believe that in the Providence of God he (Lincoln) had
filled his mission as we all know taht he was too lenient to punish
rebels accoring to their just deserts••• • I agree with you that
all the rebels that were ignorant and were misled into the rebellion
(sic) should be gently dealt with.but certainly all well informed and
designing rascals should be severely punished and if they are treated
otherwise I would not give a fi� for our government. He will neither
be respected at home or abroad. J4
As president, Johnson appeared a moderate engaged in pardoning unequivocally
those whom he had formerly persecuted.

Thus, he Has accused of having

drifted South; such was the charge made against him in a newspaper clip
ping sent to him in September which stated the forthcoming viewpoint:
It is about time for P resident Johnson to stop and take an observation
of his latitude. He will discover that he has drifted 'South' a long
way, and is in a dangerous current that may strand his craft on the
Florida reefs. The sea thereabouts is filled with sharks and other
monsters of prey. His only safety is to sail in Republican seas and
remain in company with the victorious Union fleet of iron clads and
monitors. When such sheets as the New York World, New York News,
Chicago Times and Detroit Free Press praise his reconstruction policy,
tender him-their enthusiastic 'support, 1 then and gleefully compare
his course toward the Republican party with that of John Tyler towards
the Whigs, we submit that it is high time he 1 slowed 1 down steam, stopped.
and took an observation of his present whereabouts and the direction in
which he is sailing. 3 5
In reality, however, the man Johnson actually remained the same; the
issues alone had changed by the revolution effected by the recent war.

John

son was still an ardent Unionist.

To him, now, however, the definition of

a Unionist was somewhat altered.

Durjng and following the war, a Unionist

was one who believed the Union inviolate.
impossible and disunion, inconceivable.

Secession had, therefore, been
As long as the South remained out

side the Union, the Union was not held inviolate.

Consequently, the Unionist

after tho war was to Johnson one who desired an immediate reinstatement of the
Southern states thereby effecting total union.

The pardon would constitute

the tool by which such a reunion could be fostered.

Devoid of their power-

derived from slaves--and subject to the degradation of pardoning, the land-

-30owners could present no obstacle to the perpetuity of the Union.

Likewise,

Johnson's position in relation to Negro suffrage represented no actual
change.

As far as he was concerned, the war had been fought to preserve the

Union, not to free the slaves.

Formerly, in the Senate, he had voted with

the abolitionists in alliance against such privileged power which he be
lieved to be conspiring to destroy the Union.
constructionist ., .. · ·· ·

Being a Southerner and strict-

Johnson sincerely believed that suffrage should

be left to the discretion of the states which were constitutionally dele
gated to set the voting qualifications. A discrepancy seems extant in
Johnson's letter to Sharkey, recommending a qualified suffrage for the
Negro.

In reality, however, Johnson had little intention of allowing the

Negro to vote; his suggested qualifications would have given the suffrage
only to a minute portion of the South's freedmen. Moreover, Johnson failed
to have a very substantial conception of the significance of the issue in
volving the freedmen.

He, like Lincoln, was basically oblivious to the

Negro; his concern was, during the war, the preservation of the Union;
following the war, this concern shifted to a restoration of the preserved
Union.

There was no actual shift. Only inadvertently and in his desire to

rapidly restore the South--thereby marshalling the support of a large num
ber of components for his new party--did such a shift ostensibly occur.
An

internal deterrent to the success of Johnson's reconstruction

policy was the Freedmen's Bureau. This was an institution created by an
act of Congress on Harch3, 1865 ., which established a bureau for the control
of all subjects relating to the freedmen and refugees of the South. Hore
than any other phase of reconstruction, this organization aroused the en
mity of the conservative whites.

Theoretically, the purpose of the bureau

was to wrest order frOtl\ the chaotic conditions resulting from the war.

-31That there was a great deal of corruption appear-s evident from the reports
primarily of John Wallace and those revealed later through the joint committee
hearings.

The prominent aristocrats viewed the Bureau as a �cheme of its

officials to profit themselves ecomonically and politically.

To them, the

legal power wielded by the Bureau posed a potential danger; they believed
that the Negro was in as equally great a need for discipline as for the
welfare doled out by the Bureau,

From the officers of the Freedmen's

Bureau also came the belief prevalent amone; the Negroes that they would
eventually be given the apportioned land of their former masters.

General

Grant warned Johnson of this in December:
In some instances, I am sorry to say, the freedman's mind does not seem
to be disabused of the idea that a freedman has the right to live
without care or provision for the future. The effect of the belief
i� �ivi��on of lands is idleness and accumulation in camps, towns, and
c1.t1.es • .:>
Such uas the case,

The vagrancy of the Negro was the spur which stimulated,

more than any other single problem, the passing of the infrunous Black
Codes,

Although the Bureau effected some worthwhile measures and righted some

wrongs, it proved, because of its independent workin�s and questionable tac
tics, a point of contention which Johnson virtually ignored as he apparently
made no effort in 1065 to oversee its machinery. His non-committal attitude-
to boil forth only in later 1866--necessitated that the Southerners them
selves combat the organization which they did with the Black Codes,
Such "nefarious" measures were thus enacted in the Southern legislatures
assembling in the last months of 1865,

Generally, in both the conventions

and later legislatures, the Southern delegates proved too conservative to
effect the radical changes demanded by the new dynamic age wrought by tre
Civil 1.-Jar.

Half-heartedly, they did manage to act upon the three pre

requisites which Johnson intimated as necessary to restoration--abolition,

-32repudiation of uar debts, and a declaration rend0ric1g secession null and
void.

The results were far from

agreeable to the North.

South Carolina

complied with two of the three pre�requisites, refusing to repudiate the
debts.

Instead of nullifying the ordinance of secession, Georgia repealed

it, thereby insinuating that it had been initially legal. The remaining
states acted in accordance with Johnson's requirements, though in a dilatory
and hesitant fashion.

To the South in general and to B.F. Perry, in parti

cular, the North, via the N.Y. !ribun� issued the following warning:
It is scarcely good taste for the just-pardoned governor, Perry
addressing a half-pardoned convention, to cast an imputation on the
purposes of the loyal states, and to arraign a great dominant politi
cal party in those states for its views on national policy... • We
assure him in all kindness that South Carolina must present herself
at the doors of the House next December with words quite other than
this on her repentant lips.37
Northern indignation knew no bounds when the legislatures assembled and
began the enactment of the Black Codes. By the time of Johnson I s message
to Congress in December, 1865, all of the legislatures except Mississippi
had ratified the thirteenth amendment.

It uas, however, with the Negro

that the legislation was primarily concerned.

To Southerners, the Negroes

were young children suddenly alienated from parental authority.

As such,

the Southern legislatures, forced to recognize such freedom, tried to adopt
a code by which the freedmen would be disciplined by law. The result was
the enactment of the so-called Black Codes dealing with crime, morality,
apprenticeship, vagrancy, and labor contracts. Generally, the Negro was
considered free but subject to certain necessary restrictions designed to
keep him in check.

The whites feared the chaos which the freedmen, as

products of a disrupted order, had been allowed to precipitate. In addition,
they feared an amalgamation with a race possessing equal rights, but one

-33they knew to be inferior to their own.
result.

The Black Codes were the natural

On the other hand, the Negroes' position was considerably improved.

To him were granted what appeared to the Southerner to be an adequate
number of rights and privileges.

He could hold property, marry, sue and

be sued, and give testimony in litigation involving hi.s own
did not feel that he was ready
North's population.

to vvto, Lui., lu=d.thA'l'
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did a majority of the

Complacently, assured of a congenial reception of its

magnanimous legislation by the President and, therefore, by the North as
a 1vhole, the South then proceeded to elect its congressmen and finally to
be fully reinstated in the Federal government.

In so doing, they generally

elected prominent Confederates for the state and national legislatures whom
they believed to be the best qualified for the positions.
tery in electing Alexander Stephens enraged the North.

Georgia's

effron

Increasingly, Northern

sentiment regarded the South as having failed all the tests requisite to a
reconstruction.

Quite possibly, Johnson could have forestalled the harsh

ness of the Black Codes had he demonstrated a firmer attitude towards the
South and had he recognized the importance of the Negro as the "index."
As this Southern legislation demonstrates, one of the most remarkable
shifts occurred not in Andrew Johnson, but in the attitudes manifested by
the South durinG this period.
to Johnson thrm•�1!
·�-'-- clfld report en

thA

.,..Ar,0

-=•·+,,

Primarily, these Southern vietvS became knot-m
"'£

Uu-eo

men sent by the President to investi-

conditions and opinions :in thA South; these men were

Carl Schurz, S.P. Chase--the more radical-- H. Hatterson, the moderate.

Following the Northern triumph, their- ••the Southerners--general reaction
was one of submission.
in late July:

Carl Schurz noted this in a report to the President

r -
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In almost all the conversations I have had, this was their ( the
intelligent rebels) standinG admission, ar..d almost uniformly in the
same words: 11 The war has decided that there shall be no secession
and that the slaves are emancipated. lfo cannot be expected to give
up our principles and convictions of right, but we submit to the re
sult and want to be reinstated in the enjoyment of our rights. 1
Host of them are by no means willing to acknowledge the Constitutionality
of coercion and of the E�ancipation Proclamation. It is g�n'3rally
a submission to overpowering force. 3 8
J, H. Wilson wrote similarly from Georgia that

11 • • •

there is no sentiment of

true loyalty prevailing or that the affections of the people are directed to
wards the North and the legitimate government ••• but on the other hand there
is no manifestation of hatred or a desire for farther opposition. The
people express an external submission ••• • 11 39 During the summer months, the
attitudes underwent a change largely because the President seemed to change
towards them.

After the surrender, the South appeared docile and attempted

to placate its conqueror 1vith studied submission-- in effect, it courted
the favor of the government.

The reversal came when Johnson--representing

the government as Congress would not assemble until December--began court
ing the South in order to solidify the lines of his new party.
Barlow wrote Blair that

11 • •

In July,

,the South, just as rapidly as his (Johnson's)

reconstruction plans are carried out, will be a Johnson party, and that
nothing can prevent this unless the President wills it otherwise. 11

4°

The South was extremely vulnerable to such a echeme; the almost universal cry
uas as A.N. 1vilson wrote Johnson from Tennessee

11, .

,what shall we do to be

saved ? 1141 And Johnson became the savior granting salvation through the
pardoning power.

In September, Mrs. John A. Jackson of Tennessee wrote

to the President that "Our S<?utheE� brothers are beginning to know that
you are their friend,

their protector, and to

�1

that.

In thy hands

a Nation's fate lies circled, its dangers great and its peril imminent.

To you they look and pray for pardon... • 1142 Rapidly, Johnson was recog-

-35nized by the South as the government; as the interpreter of Northern opinion
and, as the government, they were deaf to instructions or opinions other
than his.

This, in part, resulted from the relatively mild demands Johnson

made of them--they wanted Johnson ls demands to be those and only those
with which they had to comply.

Doubtless, they had entirely tnn

mvun

faith

in the President and totally failed to realize the vast cba,c,m 'between the
policies of Johnson and those desired by the Northern majority.
Johnson's profuse pardonings, vacillation, and leniency in the South
did indeed rally their support to his party; hmiever, by such policies, he
also created an arrogant South, one who no longer curried the favor of the
North as the conqueror, but who accepted such favor as its due.

They no

longer felt required to skulk in defeat; they now were able to walk proudly
again recognizing the cause for which they had fought as a noble one.

Thus,

in September, Baton Rouge's !E�eekly Advocate contained the following
proclamation:
President Johnson has 1 forced' a number of men 1 prominent in the
rebellion' into high positions since he became President •••• The
long and short of it is, this cry about men not running for office
who have fought heroically for the past four years in a cause they
loved, is all nonsense •••• Their past bravery and their frank sub
mission to the Government is the best guarantee of th/Hr future fidelity,
a fact known and already recognized by the President.
Both Johnson and the South made the mistake of concentrating too heavily
upon one another and too little on the rest of the country and government
respectively.

Multiplying zero by zero, the product was zero.

Johnson,

without a party, and the South, without political existence, thus proved a
combination easily defeated.

Both attained the support of one another,

but they lost the support of the majority; both became zealous allies of the
politically impotent.

In November, R.H. Flournoy wrote Stevens from Missis-

-36sippi that 11·whatever genuine Union sentiment was forming and would in time
have grown up, has been checked by Hr. Johnson's course, he has made a great
mistake.
• • •

• 11

He is now the favorite of all the diseffected (sic) elements here •

4l..i. Most hostile to the presidential course were those Unionists who

were 'being iGnored by the President I s favor.

As early as June, Texas

Unionists felt compelled to write Johnson recommending the more drastic
military rule as the only safe course; the following demonstrates this:
He believe the people generally opposed to military rule, still we
greatly prefer a loyal military government to a disloyal civil one.
The disadvantages of delay will be felt by the loyal as well as by
the disloyal. We earnestly hope that reorganization in our state
will be deferred un��l the truly loyal feel that it can be success
fully accomplished.
Johnson, however, remained adamant in his policy of pardoning towards the
former rebels.

Likmvise, the South continued on its course impervious

to Northern rumblings of dissatisfaction, trusting totally in the judgement
of Johnson.

The general consensus of opinion regarding the radicals was

summed up by the Charleston Dai!y_�� which stated that

11

'It may safely

be said that the views and opinions of Sumner, Thad Stevens, T.Jilson, and
some of the Northern Radicals have been considered too unworthy to be
seriously commented upon by members of the convention.

It is well known that

the sentiments of those gentlemen are extremely unpopular in the North.

111
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The sentiments of those gentlemen were perhaps untapped in the North, but
they were extremely unpopular only to Johnson by whom the South erroneously
gauged popular opinion.
For any sort of gauging instrument, Johnson was a poor choice.
Johnson was not in his true position.
head of the government.

Firct,

As president, he was the recognized

Johnson, however, assumed the identity of the

entire government and acted in his accustomed autocratic manner.

Secondly,

-37his dogmatic mind had already characteristically

determined the course he

planned to follow and it would remain unalterable.

Johnson revealed much

the same to James G. Bennet, editor of the New York Horal�, in October
when he stated that he "• •• entered upon this Presidential term with a fixed
and unalterab}P, determination to administer the Government upon the principles
which will bring the people, as near as may be, in close proximity with
·
all the acts and doings
of their public servant s... • 1147rn add"i t·ion, Johnson
not only insisted upon a "fixed and unalterable" course, but he also insisted
upon considering such a course as being that which the "people II wanted.
Thus, his letter to Bennett ended on a typical note when he said that "· ••
so far, in public life, the people have sustained me.

I have never deserted

them, and if I know my own heart, I will stand by them now ••• •

4 8 Had

11

Johnson devoted greater energy to adapting himself to the opinions of the
period and less time to pursuing his "fixed and unalterable" course, he
could have achieved the success he sought.

Although by the end of December

the South was actively pro-Johnson, this support had been won only because
Johnson, in his ignoble benevolence, allowed them free rein.
distasteful to the North Has the result.

Legislation

In winning so complete a victory

in the South, Johnson had alienated the North.

As the South wa.s a virtual

political nonentity, Johnson's policies and, ultimately, Johnson, himself,
proved unsuccessful.
The arrogant attitudes of the Southerner legislators triggered certain
reactions in the North--the most vehement opposition coming from the Sumner
Stevens or radical elements.

From the beginning, the radicals J as did the

other elements, desired that Johnson ally himself with their interests.
During the early stages of his presidency, Johnson's vacillati�n allayed any

-38particularly virulent political animosity.

All elements believed that he

favored their strategy or specific policies.

1,Jith the radicals, the situation

differed somewhat; it soon became evident that Johnson was following a
more moderate policy towards the South than they might have wished.

How

ever, they, by terming such a policy experimental, managed to justify the
President's actions.

In June, L.1'1. Harrill wrote to Sumner categorizing the

President I s actions as an experiment.

In essence, he stated that "The

president is trying to demonstrate his theory of restoring states ••• •
will fail of course.
tion in it.
try it.

It

There is constitutional revolution and Negro insurrec

Nobody approves it.

Still, it is but an experiment--let him

That I think is the feeling. 1149

On this basis, they tolerated, as

the most expedient course, Johnson's lenient policy.

Johnson himself soon

cast dcubts upon this concept when he wrote Schurz in August voicing a netv
:Ldea concerning the latter I s Southern mission.

Originally, Schurz had been

sent to the South as one of several--H.M. Watterson, Truman, and Carl
Schurz--to investigate attitudes and conditions in the area.

Generally, the

Schurz reports proved unfavorable to Johnson's moderate program as they
depicted the South as still rebellious and unreconstructed.

In August,

therefore, Johnson telegraphed Schurz expressing the true purpose of Schurz's
mission as being one

11

to aid as far as practicable in carrying out the

policy adopted by the Government (i.e., Johnson) for restoring the states
to their former relations with the Federal Government. 1150
that he hoped that "such aid had been given. 11

He ended by saying

By the end of 1865, even

imak semblances of compatibility between the radicals and Johnson had been
shattered by the actions of the Southern conventions and legislatures which
proved too blatant to be ignored by the North.

As early as July, Johnson

-39had received warnings from the radical faction; Stevens was probably the most
candid among those who wrote.

In a letter dated July 6, Stevens stated that

,r.rnong all the leading union men of the North with whom I have had inter

11

course I do not find one who app!'oves of your policy.

They believe that

1restoration t as annour.ced by you.will destroy our party which is of little
consequence and will greatly injure this country.

Can you not hold your

hand and wait the action of congress and in the meantime govern them by
military rulers--Profuse pardon::.ng also will greatly embarrass congress if
they should wish to make the enemy pay the expenses of the war or a part o:f
it. 11 51

Johnson w as warned to move cautiously and admonished for his profuse

pardoni:cgs; generally, it was a plea to better adapt his policies to those
of the more radical elements.
Basically, however, the radicals were against Johnson Is restoration
policies and hoped that the experiment would fail.

Johnson's policy would

negate thelr plans which included political dominance and the perpetuity of
the revolution begun by the war.

Josephson calls this revolution a progressive

bourgeois one in his Politicos.

Such a rev-,lution uas initiated by the legish:-

------

tion passed during the preceding war--the Morrill tariff, the Homestead
Act, and federal aid to the railroad--all of which would probably never have
been passed had the South not seceeded and absented itself from the Senate
and House.

The radicals did not want to battle again against a restored,

obstructionist South.

If Johnson, through his moderte presidential policy,

could have reconstructed th9 South employing the Negro and Unionist as
indices, the radicals would have accepted such a reconstructed South, but
they were unable to accept a restored and unaltered one.

To test the degree

to uhich the South was actually reconstructed, the majority of the North
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used the Negro as its index.

The legislation passed by the so-recently

restored states left no question in the minds of the radicals as to the
position of the South.

Led by the reactionary Johnson, the South was attempt

ing to return to its ante-bellum past changing only its substitution of the
wage system for the abolished slavery.

Johnson had furthered such an aim

by restoring almost immediately the formerly rebellious states.

Throughout

1865 and primarily as the result of the reports received from the unhappy
and afflicted Unionists decrying the still-rebellious atmosphere of the South,
the radicals had cautioned delay which would allow time for the South to
be reconstructed, but the President was intent upon his predetermined policy
of haste.

--------

Sumner wrote Schurz in October that "The rebel states must not

be allowed�t once�participate in our governmen�.
be postponed ••• •

There must be delay.

This privilege must

The president does not see this,

every step that he takes is toward perdition. 115 2 Again, Johnson erred in his
attempt to adhere to Lincoln's wartime polciy of restoration.

Haste was

necessary in wartime in order to effect greater dissension and chaos to divide
the Confederte ranks.

However, such a policy proved fatal in the post-

war era in which the primary objective was that of unity rather than division.
Indeed, Johnson seemed to ignore the radicals.

---

The New Orle8ns Pic�vune

noted that Johnson was pleased with Southern restoration and cared "' ••• not
a snap of his fingers whether the Radicals like it or not. ru53 Johnson
seemed unaware of the importance of remaining friendly towards the radicals
who had, as James Michie of chicago pointed out to the President,
lected him. 11

11 • • •

e

Increasingly, too, Michie pointed out, Johnson was allowing

himself to be duped by the hated aristocrats--Johnson was becoming more
closely identified with the Southern rebels. 54

-41Had he lost the radical

support, Johnson could still have retained his

political power had he managed to first unite and then maintain the support
of the moderates--the Seward-Weed Republican elements and the Democrats.
He did manage to retain control of the Democracy, but lost the more signifi
cant support of the moderate Republicans which proved ruinous to his scheme
for a new Johnson party.

The Democracy was too closely associated with the

preceding rebellion to prove extremely advantageous to a political as
pirant; thus, for propaganda purposes as well as for strength, the Republi
cans were vital to the survival of Johnson, the politician.

Within the

the Republican party, there were, as has been partially already demonstrated,
several factions--the radicals, the moderates, and the pro-Johnson Republi
cans like Dixon and Doolittle who favored Johnson's every move, seemingly
without discrimination.

The most important of these various elements for

Johnson to hold was the moderates o

At..the beginning, this element vied with

the Democracy for Johnson's favor.

This is readily observed in the moderate

New York Times in which is evidenced

also a

moderacy to relative radicalism by the end of
the

:£�

gradual change from relative

1865.

It was furthermore

which set up the Negro as the index although denying that, the

real question was Negro suffrage.

In August, the Times stated that 11The

real question as to the future political status of the Negro is whether

he should be protected against injustice rather than suffrage. 11 55 Basically,
they were prepared to support Johnson for, as they said in September,
"President Johnson founds all his practical policy upon the presumption
that the South is fit to be trusted.

His radical opponents found theirs

upon the presumption that the South is unfit to be trusted.

When the

contrary is shown, then and not until then, will the time come for a

different policy. 11 56

In November, the Times warned the South that they

-42should grant more civil and social rights to the Negro

in

order to foil

the radicals, adding ominously that "If the South will not do this, the
nation Must.

It cannot be left undone. 1157 By December, the� seemed

extremely dubious concerning the humility of the vanquished South as is
shown in the following editorial:
This high demand for an immediate return of the chairs that were
kicked down is not humility. This impatient elbowing through the
crowd to the Clerk's desk for the chance to say who shall be Speaker
is not humility. We venture to predict that the loyal representatives
will so conceive, and will with all due civility invite these gentle
men to keep the back seats in the lobby until they are sent for. 58
The Times is seen almost parroting the radicals' plea for caution

in

re

turning the South to Congress:
The northern people will not see with composure the wheels blocked
by the insisting of these Southern claimants to seats •••• A"deoision
that is to carry with it such results should be formed with great
caution, and only after the most conclusive proof that these states
now possess a genui�� loyalty, and are prepared to perform all their
appropriate duties.
Such appropriate duties referred to the Negro.

In November, the�

had appealed to the South to eradicate the Black Codes.

"The infamous

black codes must be swept out of existence to the last atom. Laws must
be established calculated to raise the colored man to full manhood instead
of farcing him down to the level of a brute. u60 By the end of December,

the Times had been almost completely convinced that the South was not
gcing to perform such duties; this was evidenced when the� began re
ferring to the codes as the "bloody codes." The South had proved itself
to be still rebellious and, therefore, in need of the reconstruction demar1,
by the radicals who based their platform primarily on Negro suffrage as th
only means
sion.

by

which the Negro would be freed from the white man's oppres

The fault, in reality, lay with Johnson who, had he more firmly

1
:

-43demanded greater social and civil rights for the Negro, would have seen them
granted.

As it was, however, he lost the moderate Republicans.

By December,

the Times was still outwardly pledging support of the President, but it came

out freqne1:i t-.ly at v.<tr.l:=inrA with the President Is policy.
Contributing to the gradual shift. o.f the moderate Republicans to a
support of the radicals--that is, Negro suffrage--was the projected animosity
of the Democrats.
Weed elements.

The Blair-Barlow elements opposed union with the Seward

Although this animosity ultimately frustrated his plans

for the Johnson party, Johnson did little to amend the situation. Throughout,
this Democratic element urged a studied cultivation of Southern support.
Blair wrote Johnson in early August significantly that 11 The vote of the
South will be drawn almost as a unit to the side of that party which it finds
to be in opposition to a ministry known to be hostile to its dearest rights
in th e union... • 1161

In effect, this only reiterated what Barlow ha.d earlier

written when he stated to Johnson that 11 ••• the whole, party is toda_y a
Johnson party:

that the South just as rapidly as his reconstruction plans

are carried out, will be a Johnson party. 1162

In order to further strengthen

their position, the Democrats attempted to make Negro suffrage an issue,
erroneously believing the majority of the North to be opposed to this.

The

Times recognized such a design and denied suffrage claiming with the Presi
dent that suffrage should be left to the states,

Thus, from the first, however,

the proclivities of Johnson and the Democracy were more closely allied.
Both advocated that restoration be immediate and that Negro suffrage be left
to the states, and both did this for the same reasons--constitutional
principles and--more important--to win the South's political support. The
Democratic organ, the New York�' made this clear in October in its

-44reporting ofa .conversation which the President engaged with the World
editor, Manton Marble.

The conversation ran as follows:

The president••• told Mr. Marble••• that he was dAt.fn-mined to stand
or fall on his plan for t.hA immodiate 1·estoration of the Union. He
had staked t.hP- m.ivvt:ss of his admini11tration on that plan, and not
only this, but he staked his own present and future place in the
history of the country upon it.
Those who sustain me, added the President, I will sustain.
who oppose, I will oppose.

Those

3

In his whole conversation with Mr. Marble, he g rsistently avowed
himself a Democrat--as much today as ever••• •

It seemed that Johnson had capitulated to the Democracy, at least according
to the Democratic press.

Such notices further alienated the Republicans

who were unable to trust the Southern and formerly Democratic President.
To entrench their positon with the President, the Democrats attacked the
experiment concept perpetuated by the radicals and supported somewhat by the
moderate Republicans.

In September, the New York World blasted this idea

in the following manner"
It has been, for a while, the cue of the Radicals to pretend that
the President regarded his policy as a doubtful experiment••• • But
a succession of significant acts has destroyed this hope.
rhe letter
of congratulations to the 11iss. convention, the reversal of the
military order arresting the organization of the State militia by
Governor Sharkey, the noble, magnanimous, and confiding speech to the
Southern delegation, the policy of the President is fixed; that no choice
is left them but open opposition••• • " 64
Thus, it was the Democrats, rather than the radicals, who forced ra dical
reconstruction.

By insisting upon immediate restoration minus any

reconstruction, they frightened the North into an acceptance of a more
radical--encompassing Negro suffrage--program.
Both the radicals and the Democrats represented the extreme factions of
the period.

The one demanded reconstruction, the other restoration.

desired these unconditionally.

Both

The moderate Republicans, conversely, de-
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A:t:red restoration until the South demonstrated hy i.ts act.ions that it would
have to be reconstructed.

Johnson became too closely identified with .the

Democratic extreme--this eJltreme is deemed moderate generally because of its
Unionist sentiments, but was extreme in reference to the South after the
war, as indeed was Johnson.

When Johnson began receiving the praise

of such Copperhead organs as the Lancaster Intelligencer, it was time for
him to re-evaluate his political moorings and rd-align if necessary.

Only

towards the end of the year did Johnson obviously become concerned enough
tot�legraph.his provisional governors regarding the Unionists• protests
�hat the/governors were appointing prominent rebels.

Johnson obviously

suspected that something was going wrong, but seemed reassured.bytthe,
answers of the governors who generally denied the charge, later amending
such denial by stating that in some cases it had been necessary to appoint
former rebels when qualified Union men were not available.65

Johnson, it

seemed, however, again refused to accept any discrepancy between what he
heard to be true and what he had already predetermined was true.
deviation from his truth was erroneous.

Any

Therefore, by December, it was

obvious that Presidential reconstruction had failed.

As Luther C. Carter

wrote to Stevens from New York in December, the North could not accept the
present conditions in the South.

He maintained that "This hand of fellow

ship has been but partially accepted, even outwardly, whilst in spirit,

it has been manifestly rejected." Furthermore, he believed that 11 ••• an
armed force of white men, should be kept in each one of the rebellious
states, and at the expense of the property of such states, sufficient to

keep the peace ••• • It seems to me that, there should be no further pardoning of, or t'<i,...1 nying ni th t.ho puop1"' of those states .for tho present
1166
The South had to be reconstructed on the northern model before

... .

-46the North deemed it safe to readmit its states.
block erected

by

To effect this, the stumbling

the different policy of the President had to

be

overcome.

By his own political errors, Johnson had become the opposition.
The events of 1865 prepared the way for the final break between Johnson
and the moderates in 1866 which occurred over the Freedmen's Bureau Bill.
In December of 1865,

an editorial in the New York� had clearly indicated

the Moderate Republicans stand in reference to the maintenance of the
Freedman's Bureau in stating the following:
••• Without following through the most valuable reports of the assistant
commissioners of the Bureau. and General Howard's conclusions, we may
observe· that no reasonable man.. can read these calm official docu
ments without feeling that ••• for some time yet military forces of the
U.S. be retained in the South, and its (Freedmen) guardian protection
both over Negroes and whites, tllrough the Freedmen's Bureau, should
be continued. The removal of that Bureau iould throw everything in
the late insurgent states into confusion." 7
Having used the Negro as the "index" by which the South 1 s reconstruction
was to be judged, this group was disappointed in the conditions which had
resulted within the Southern states. As speaker Colfax phrased it, they
felt that they could not

11 • • •

abandon them (the Negroes) and leave them de

fenseless at the mercy of their former o�mers. They must be protected
in their rights of person and property •••• 11 68 Such protection demanded
the presence of the Freedmen's Bureau or equality before the law for the
Negroes. The stand of the moderates on this is demonstrated by the Times
reporting of the Sharkey-Slocum controversy over the Freedmen's Bureau.
Slocum, apparently, desired the total dissolution of the Freedmen's Bureau
while Sharkey advocated the maintenance of tl:e Bureau but a transferrence
of court cases to the civil courts wherein the Negroes would be awarded
the same rights as those granted the whites.

The Times denounces Slocum and

praises Sharkey.69 Therefore, it follows that Johnson 1 s veto would violate
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the results of the "index" thereby alienating moderate support.

By such

a veto, Johnson identified himself with the Democratic element--the Democrat,
Slocum, specifically�-who viewed the Bureau as a deterrent to the rapid
restoration they desired for the South. Although the� demonstrates
an obvious disagreement--shown in the preceding quotations--with the policy
which Johnson later materializes as his, it, nevertheless, continues through
out the latter months of 1865 and early 1866 to pledge its loyalty to the
President.
Frequently, especially in the rehabilitation biographies, Johnson
is treated as the victim of a Republican conspiracy.

Gideon Welles, the

Democratic member of Johnson's cabinet, is generally cited as the source of
this premise.
one.

The interpretation Welles gives in his diary is a credible

As he sees it,

can one.
radicals.

the conspiracy is not a radical plot , but a Republi

A Democrat, he makes little distinction between moderates and
Intermittently, Welles casts reflections on the sincerity of

Secretary Seward.

On October 21, he writes in his diary that Seward made a

speech the preceding day "glorifying himself and Stanton." It is, however,
in January of 1866 that Welles makes his most explicit charge regarding
a Republican conspiracy.

His entry in January is footnoted in the following

manner:
The President was at this time greatly embarrassed by the advice and
suggestions of Mr. Seward, who, though personally friendly to the
President and the administration, was himself so much of a party man,
and so much under the influence of extreme partisans, as to be governed
rather by party than by country. It was the aim and object of his
N.Y. friends to keep alive party distinctions created by secession and
the war, and to throw the power of the administration into the Re
publican, or, in other words, Radical hanrls ••• the New York politicians
had, therefore, a double part to play, and Hr. Seward was
their agent to effect their purpose. Whilst Thaddeus Stevens
and the extreme Radicals were making war on the Executive, it was

-48important for the New Yorkers and indeed for men of similar views
in other States not to break immediately with the P1·osidAnt,, l.io.t,
to use the power and patronage of the Executive to promote their
own ends. 11 70
This undoubtedly contains fact; the bias of Welles, however, must be
considered.

Probably more plausible is the theory that Johnson, by his

own actions, alienated the moderates, than one implying that there was

any

preconceived plot between the moderate and radical Republicans to oust
Johnson and wield all power themselves.

When Johnson failed to effect the

moderate reconstruction which encompassed securing Negro civil rights, the
moderates were forced to seek the aid of other elements.

To the moderates,

the program they advocated had been the most moderate possible; a program less
moderate, they felt, could not win sufficient popular sup�ort to insure
political victory in 1 66 and '68.

Their natural allies were their fellow

Republicans who had been forced to a more radical stand on Negro suffrage by
the equally radical--though radical conversely in being so reactionary--Democratir
stand for white supremacy ·which had been instigated early and propagandized
thoroughly.

The moderates felt that their political being depended upon

separation from Johnson who was rapidly becoming more closely aligned with
the disaffected--tbe Copperheads, the Democrats, and the rebels.
By the end of 18t5, the moderate reconstruction (i.e., restoration)
policy of Andrew Johnson had failed.
political judgement exercised
quate maneuvers.

by

its executor which in turn effected inade

Upon his advent to the presidency, Andrew Johnson was both

blessed and cursed politically.
flourish.

Its defeat resulted from the poor

About. him, political blessings seemed to

As president, he headed the great Union party which had been respon

sible for the recent war victory.

In this position, he was lauded

by

all of the former ante-bellum Democratic and Republican factions--his
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political possibilities seemed infinite.
contention existed.

On the other hand, elements of

Primarily, these elements centered ·around the problem

of reconstructing the recently rebellious South. As Lincoln's accidental
heir, Johnson apparently believed himself obligated to carry out Lincoln's
wartime policy of reconstruction which was actually one of restoration.
Such a course revealed certain stwnbling blocks raised chiefly by the
defects in Johnson's inflexible character.

Johnson, the absolutist, presented

a startling contrast to Lincoln, the pragmatist, and their respective policies
evidenced the imprint of this basic difference.

In combining vacillation,

inflexibility, and inaccessibility, Johnson allowed the favorable political
atmosphere to disintegrate.

His vacillation forestalled the vital solidifi

cation of the surrounding political elements into a party which would support
him in 1866 and in 1868.

His inflexibility committed him to a preconceived

policy or·restoration wrought out of his own biographical influences and
Lincolnian inheritances.
opinion.

His inaccessibility made him impervious to public

David Donald states in his article entitled 11Why They Impeached

Andrew Johnson" that public opinion was everything to Lincoln and not hing
to his successor. 7l Johnson, thus, followed unalterably a plan of total
restoration while even the most modera'lemajority--the Seward-Heed element,
particularly--advocated minor reconstruction--concerning civil rights-as a prerequisite to restoration.
Partisan-wise, Johnson was, again, at the outset, in a precarious

position.

Prior to the war, he had been a staunch Southern Democrat.

His

Appalachian background made him a Unionist for the duration of the war, and
it was on the Unionist ticket that he was elected Vice-President. As a
Democrat, Johnson was basically strict-constructionist and reactionary;
as such, he quite naturally viewed the termination of the war as the moment
to begin a restoration of the South to its ante-bellum status.

The more

-50progress:..-minded North, houever, was moro concerned with: the preservation
of the political and ooonomic fruits of victory.

For them, the war had

proved a revolution and they desired that its effects be perpetuated.

The

old South could not be reinstated as it would possibly attempt to reassert
its former roadblocks to Northern progress. A new South, however, recon.9 t,1'ucte<l
on the Northern model, could be reinstated with impunity.

To the North, the

slave position of the Negro had provided the foundation of the old South.
Thus, the North designated his--the Negro 1 s--treatment by the South as the
11

index 11 or gauging instrument by which the degree of reconstruction in the

Southern states would be judged.

Johnson, by not recognizing the importance

of the index, lost his political future.

He had envisioned a great National

Union Party composed of the Democrats and the moderate Republicans which
1iould re-elect him in

1 68.

By concentrating totally on restoration, Johnson

precluded the necessary reconstruction thereby losing the vital moderate sup
port.

Reinstatement of the Southern states was the universal question.

For

Johnson, a rapid restoration would prove both politically advantageous and in
character with his constitutional and reactionary views... For the North, delay
was 11the better part of valor. 11 A delay would allow time for the South to be
reconstructed and thereby prove more acceptable to the North.

Consequently, as

the year lengthened, the discr�pancy between the reconstruction policy desired
by the North and the one promulgated by Johnson increased.

Increasingly, also,

Johnson became affiliated with the hated Democracy who were attempting, it seemeci
to the Republicans, to discredit reconstruction as they had lilr01-1ise tried
to discredit the prededing war which had been fought primarily to effect such
reconstruction.

To combat the Democracy's platform of white supremacy, the

radical Republicans advocated Negro suffrage. When Johnson seemingly ac
quiesced in the Democratic platform by his insistence upon his restoration
policy, the moderate Republicans, believing their index violated, naturally

-51joined 1-rith their radical components to protect the NegI,'o by securing his
civil rights.

Johnson eas supported only by the disaffected.

The Union

party, largely ROpublican L"1 compostition, reverted to its pre-war Republi
canism thus alienating Johnson and shattering his hopes for a bri6ht future
under the auspices of his National Union party.

1

lith the failure of' his

reconstruction policy, Johnson, the national politician, was deposed.

With

the failure of Johnson, the politician, radical reconstruction was substituted
for the moderate policy of restoration.
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